Labor and Politics in Spain Today by Martin, Benjamin
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Labor and Politics in Spain Today"
 
Benjamin Martin








Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 11 février 2017 03:18
Labor and Politics in Spain Today 
Benjamin Martin 
The îrade unions élections of 1977 in Spain conferred a 
formai end of four décades of labour authoritarianism 
and marked the second major électoral process that has 
heen established for the re-establishment of démocratie 
institutions. According to the author, the outcome has 
important implications for the emerging national political 
configuration, the restructuring of the labour-management 
relationship, and the political stratégies of the major poli-
tical parties. 
The trade union élections in Spain merit a good deal more atten-
tion than they hâve received for they represent an indispensable prere-
quisite for a restructuring of the country's industrial relations system 
and their outcome has had a sizeable impact on the gênerai course of 
social, économie, and political developments. In the highly charged at-
mosphère of Spanish national affairs that currently prevails an event of 
this magnitude becomes transformed into a social and political battle-
ground. 
The élections conferred a formai end on four décades of Franco-
style labor authoritarianism and herald the installation of a modem in-
dustrial relations system more in keeping with that of a Western Euro-
pean démocratie society. The plant level voting marked the second ma-
jor popular consultation (the first was the June, 1977 parliamentary 
élections) to hâve taken place since the end of Francoism and repre-
sents a major step in the démocratie transition process. The outcome 
has important implications for the emerging national political configura-
tion, the restructuring of the labor-management relationship, and the 
political stratégies of the major political parties. 
A government decree of December 6th ordered the holding of the 
long-awaited élections for the purpose of selecting worker bargaining 
* MARTIN, Benjamin, Director, Spanish Labor Project, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. 
108 
LABOUR AND POLITICS IN SPAIN TODAY 109 
représentatives in public and private enterprises employing a minimum 
of six employées. Those with compléments of 50 or more were also en-
titled to elect plant employée committees. They afforded workers an 
opportunity to replace the plant représentation committees of the 
Franco era (Jurados de Empresas) with new ones based on their newly 
won right to freely vote for trade union représentatives of their own 
choosing. Voting commenced January 15th and was to hâve concluded 
by mid-March but actually continued until May. Of the approximate six 
million workers located in some 186,000 enterprises that were eligible 
to participate in the voting, roughly three million hâve thus far done so. 
The level of worker participation is indeed significant since the holding 
of élections was not obligatory for employers many of whom after four 
décades of labor authoritarianism, continue to harbor strongly anti-
union attitudes, attitudes that were stimulated by the Government's 
dépréciation of the élection process.l 
The state of development in Spain today — the nascent quality of 
many institutions and political movements — results in an atmosphère 
where significant social or économie issues, to an extent greater than 
what is usually encountered el se where, are inexorably drawn into the 
vortex of political rivalries. The arrangements for the holding of the 
plant élections were no exception. Thus, what ostensibly appeared as a 
universally accepted process in the reform of the labor relations struc-
ture became quickly transformed into a cause célèbre between the So-
cialists and the Government on the one hand, the Communists and So-
cialists on the other. 
The setting of the January date was preceded by months of uncer-
tainty and confusion caused by Government indécision in arriving at a 
firm date for the holding of the plant élections. During the Fall of 1977, 
November 15th had been set as the original voting date for the 
commencement of the voting process but various intervening factors 
led to still another delay. 
An acrimonious controversy arose over the setting of the élection 
rules. The Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and its trade union ally, the 
1
 Most European countries require the sélection of employée représentatives in 
ail enterprises with a specified minimum number of employées. In Spain, however, the 
current élections were only required in those enterprises where employers and employées 
hâve agreed to their holding. In the discussions underway in the Cortes labor affairs 
commission concerning the enactment of a new collective bargaining statute, a consensus 
seems to be developing to extend representational rights to ail appropriate enterprises wi-
thin 90 days foliowing enactment of the new statute. 
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General Union of Workers (UGT) accused the Government of openly
discriminating in favor of the Communist-controlled Workers Commis-
sions Trade Union Confederation (CC.OO.) for having decided that
the elections were to be conducted on an «open list» (listas abiertas)
basis whereby candidates appear on the ballots solely as individuals
without any reference to their organizational affiliation. The system of
«closed lists» (listas cerradas) advocated by the UGT required the or-
ganizational identity of all candidates to appear on the ballots. The
Communist leadership of the Workers Commissions Confederation fa-
vored the open list method since it permitted many of their supporters
to conceal their trade union and political identities. This was a matter
of some importance since many workers, when presented with an al-
ternative to choose between a pro-Communist and a pro-Socialist can-
didate, would tend to vote for the non-Communist choice. Further-
more, the open list method was more in line with the concept of labor
unity (assemblearismo) postulated by the CC.OO. leadership.
The two approaches are also rooted in contrasting concepts of
trade union action. During the Franco era, the Workers Commissions
had evolved a distinctive form of organization and action. It served as
a semi-clandestine opposition force within the official trade union struc-
ture in the form of groups of activists supported by workers assemblies
at the plant level that were organized for specific purposes. Following
the advent of the post-Franco period and legality the CC.OO. leader-
ship sought to utilize the organization's pluralist character containing
diverse tendencies as a basis for the establishment of a unitary trade
union body. But this effort was unsuccessful because Spanish trade
unionism operates in a highly politicalized environment and the chan-
ces are therefore exceedingly poor for such a unified organization to
somehow insulate itself from its effects. Furthermore, the PCE exerci-
ses overwhelming control over the CC.OO. to which must be added the
superior party resources and cadres at its disposal, persuaded the UGT
and others that this proposal was merely a means for the Communists
to take control of the entire labor movement.
The UGT outlook represents the continuity of a historical tradi-
tion in which it has long served as the semi-independent trade union
wing of the Spanish socialist movement, in fact the UGT itself a « so-
cialist» trade union. The relationship is generally comparable to that
which prevails in other Western European countries between trade
unions and socialist parties. But as the Communist Party has increasin-
gly abandoned various tenets of Marxism-Leninism and moved closer
to the Socialist outlook, this has had the effect of often blurring exis-
ting differences in the trade union field as well. Thus, for example,
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there as yet appears to be little substantive difference between the two
labor organizations with respect to trade union action and collective
bargaining policies.
The differing electoral strategies of the UGT and CC.OO. arose
from considerations dictated by the results of the June, 1977 parliamen-
tary elections in which the Socialists did extremely well among wage
earners while the Communist, Catalonia aside, received only modest
numbers of worker votes. By stressing its «Socialist» identity the lea-
dership of the UGT hoped that workers who had voted so massively
PSOE would also support UGT. On the other hand, so as not to lose
some of its support, the CC.OO. sought to avoid becoming labelled as
a Communist-controlled organization. (21 of 23 members of the
CC.OO. Secretariat are members of the Communist Party, (PCE). It
therefore chose to emphasize its ostensibly non-political, functional
trade union character.
The government tilt toward the Workers Commissions in the
conduct of the elections was deeply resented by the Socialist Workers
Party (PSOE) and the General Union of Workers (UGT). It was sus-
pected of playing favorites because the PSOE had come so perilously
close in votes received to Prime Minister Suarez's Democratic Center
Union Party (UCD) during the June, 1977 parliamentary elections.
Moreover, the April, 1978 merger of the Popular Socialist Pary headed
by Prof. Enrique Tierno Galvan with PSOE not only has added five
additional parliamentary seats to the PSOE roster, it also means that the
combined vote of the PSP and PSOE in the June elections now brings
it to within one percent of that received by UCD. (34.7% and 33.7%)
Understandably a UGT victory, in the estimation of the UCD, would
only further strengthen its most formidable political opponent.
It, therefore, appeared of great importance for the center right
governing party to slow down or halt the Socialist momentum that has
resulted from the June, 1977 vote and, more recently, through the
consumation of a successful merger with Tierno Galvan's Socialist
group. A further success in the trade union elections might enhance
PSOE prospects for the parliamentary and municipal elections that may
be held next year.
The Communist Party (PCE), on the other hand, received a di-
sappointing 9% in June and therefore is relegated to a marginal role in
parliamentary affairs. But since both UCD and the Communists share a
common concern in checkmating PSOE it has not been uncommon for
them to cooperate in parliamentary votes or at least to find themselves
on the same side of various issues.
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By late 1977 the économie situation had deteriorated to a point 
where remédiai steps were urgently required. But the popular standing 
of the UCD was too fragile and uncertain to hazard assuming exclusive 
responsability for the institution of unpopular austerity measures. 
Prime Minister Suarez and his associâtes therefore engaged in intensive 
negotiations with the leaders of ail parliamentary parties, employer 
organizations and trade unions, successfully arriving at a gênerai 
accord on a program of économie stabilisation measures that included a 
1977 wage increase ceiling of 22%, appreciably less than the estimated 
30% rise in the cost of living. The «Moncloa Pact» as it has corne to 
be known since the talks were held in the building of that name which 
houses the résidence of the Prime Minister, also included accords 
concerned with the démocratie transition process as well as a broad 
area of social and économie problems. It also committed the parties, 
most particularly the UCD and PSOE, to a consensus policy-making 
arrangement designed to minimize conflictual situations during the tran-
sition period and the drafting of a new constitution. 
The Government's décision to postpone the date of the plant élec-
tions from mid-November to mid-January was partly motivated by a 
need to assure a period of labor peace at least until the wage restraint 
accords of the Moncloa Pact had been fully arrived at. The end of the 
year is a traditional time in many firms for the negotiation of new wage 
agreements. By changing the élection date to January many unions 
were obliged to await the sélection of new plant committees before en-
tering into wage bargaining. 
At the time of the issuance of the decree ordering élections to 
starts in mid-January the Government sought to defuse PSOE/UGT cri-
ticisms by modifying the ground rules so that enterprises with more 
than 250 employées would be required to vote by the « closed list» meth-
od while those of smaller size would continue to employ « open lists ». 
While this represented an improvement over the original arrangement, 
even under the new voting System the Workers Commissions retained 
the advantage. The spirit of the Moncloa Pact, notwithstanding, the 
UCD-PSOE rivalry continued unabated. 
Spain, it should be noted, is a country of relatively few large en-
terprises and a great mass of firms employing small numbers of 
workers. According to a leading Spanish labor specialist, taking into 
account the total number of enterprises eligible to elect worker delega-
tes, some 69.3% with 4,150,450 workers employ less than 250 and 
therefore would utilize the open list ballot while the remaining 30.7% co-
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vering 1,841,293 with work forces of 250 or more, would be chosen by 
the closed list method.2 
The élections, it should be noted, were held prior to the enact-
ment of législation stipulating the function and jurisdiction of the new 
plant employées committees or what rôle the unions are to play in the 
new industrial relations structure. The revision of the Franco era col-
lective bargaining structure had not yet been acted upon at the time of 
the élections. To make matters worse, on the eve of the commence-
ment of the plant voting, the Government suddenly made public its 
proposed employée représentation bill, one that made no mention of 
any rôle for the unions in the enterprise and casting doubt on the vali-
dity of the forthcoming élections through the insertion of a stipulation 
requiring the holding of new plant employée élections within 90 days 
following the enactment of the proposed statute. 
This approach is characteristic of a tactic frequently employed by 
the Suarez government in dealing with political opponents. It is to 
contrive a straw man and then to employ it as a bargaining chip in rea-
ching an accord along the desired Unes. This is likely to be the rôle 
assigned to the manifestly déficient collective bargaining statute propo-
sed by the Government. Now that the élections are over, substantive 
exchanges are underway between the government employ ers organiza-
tions and the two major left parties to arrive at a compromise formula. 
After having manipulated procédural rules in order to préjudice 
the chances of its Socialist rivais, the government proceeded to employ 
obstructionist tactics designed to downgrade and disparage the impor-
tance of the trade union élections. Aside from the possibly adverse ef-
fects this may hâve on the promotion of enlightened labor-management 
relations, such conduct appears consistent with the perceived interests 
of the governing party. In the June élections, the overwhelming majo-
rity of industrial workers voted Socialist or Communist to a lesser ex-
tent; a répétition was anticipated in the union élections, especially 
since the UCD has little or no constituency in this sector. As things 
turned out, their misgivings were realized: at least 80% of the plant de-
legates elected are supporters of labor organizations linked with the po-
litical Left. 
As voting commenced, it soon became évident that the Govern-
ment's effort to disparage the élections had not yet ended. No spécial 
2
 José M. ARIJA: «Revolucion en la Estructura Laboral», Historia 16, ano III, 
No. 21, Enero, 1978, p. 18. 
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facilities had been established by the Ministry of Labor to furnish 
prompt and accurate voting results as they became available from the 
hundreds of localities throughout the country. Election reports as a 
conséquence were issued only after long delays and fréquent criticism 
arose questioning their accuracy and objectivity. 
Only the number of delegates elected according to union affiliation 
was issued, no figures were furnished concerning the actual number of 
votes received by each labor organization. This was particularly rele-
vant since in one instance a delegate might be elected with as little as 
four votes while in another with as much as 150. In the absence of 
such data it is difficult to establish an accurate profile of the voting pat-
terns. The Confusion shown by the deficiencies in the Government's 
reporting System will probably make it difficult to obtain an accurate 
breadkdown of the voting results for sometime to corne. 
A bewildering assortment of labor organizations participated in 
the compétition running the gamut from vestigial remains of the former 
Franco syndical organizations, to regionalists, Communists, Socialists, 
self-management Socialists, Maoists, independents, company unions, 
etc. A number of régional organizations in the Basque area joined the 
regular national labor bodies in competing for support; the Basque 
Workers Solidarity (STV) that formerly served as the labor arm of the 
Basque Nationalist Party (PNV, a dissident wing of the STV and LAB, 
the trade union extension of the separatist movement. The historié 
anarcho syndicalist National Confédération of Labor (CNT) that served 
as the country's most important labor organization until the civil war 
period is now reduced to a marginal rôle in the Spanish labor scène. It 
decided to boycott the élections although in some scattered instances 
workers nevertheless voted for CNT candidates. 
It quickly became évident at an early stage in the élection process 
that most of thèse organizations possessed little appeal for Spanish 
workers and that the CC.OO. and the UGT would émerge as the pré-
éminent spokesmen for organized labor. According to figures compiled 
by Efe, the principal national press service, close to 70% of the 124,579 
newly elected reprensatives in 30,000 enterprises are supporters of the 
CC.OO. and the UGT.3 
3
 The reader is cautioned that discrepancies exist between the voting results 
compiled by EFE and those issued by the Labor Ministry and that neither represent fully 
accurate accountings, although the labor journalists association hâve qualified the EFE 
computations as relatively more reliable than those issued by the latter. According to the 
highly regarded Madrid daily, El Pais, the discrepancies between the two sets of figures 
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The EFE computations, as reported in the Mardi 28th issue of 
the Madrid daily, El Pais, provide the following breakdown: 
delegates 
Workers Commissions Trade Union 47,111 
Confédération (CC.OO.) 
General Union of Workers (UGT) 38,671 
Unaffiliated 15,844 
Workers Syndical Union (USO) 7,381 
Workers Unitary Trade Union Confédération 5,985 
(CSUT-Maoist) 
Unitary Trade Union (SU-Maoist) 3,376 
Basque Workers Solidarity (STV) 3,140 
Patriotic Workers Commissions (LAB) 771 
National Confédération of Labor (CNT) 339 
Basque Workers Solidarity (dissident-STVa) 309 
Canaries Workers Union (CCT) 240 
Galician Workers Union (SOG) 81 
National Galician Intersindical (ING) 28 
Catalonian Workers Solidarity (SOC) 15 
The remaining 2,289 delegates are distributed among various 
organizations ; independent unions, unions of spécifie trades or enter-
prises, especially those in banking, hospitals, commerce and transport. 
The EFE survey shows UGT leading in delegates elected in 23 
provinces and the Spanish Morrocoan enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla 
while the CC.OO. emerged ahead in 22. The UGT particularly showed 
strength in the Basque région while the CC.OO. retained a marked 
edge in Madrid and Barcelona. Only in the conservative rural provinces 
of Avila (the home of Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez) and Orense did 
the unaffiliated receive the greatest number. USO gained first place 
only in the province of Cadiz as did SU in Navarre. 
During April, subséquent to the compilation of the EFE élection 
results, the employées of the national railway system (Renfe) voted to 
sélect their représentatives ; 86% of the 70,000 employées participated 
dérive from the «precarious» nature of the former's sources while the latter's overall 
figures are distorted by the classification of large numbers of elected delegates (more than 
27,000 out of 151,000) as «does not indicate affiliation.» Nonetheless, both computations 
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in the balloting. The CC.OO. obtained 985 delegates and 47.5%, the 
UGT 681 and 32.9%, while other competing labor organizations recei-
ved a marginal scattering of support. 
The most successful among the régional labor groups has been the 
Basque Workers Solidarity (STV) which received the second largest 
number of delegates in the Basque région and reportedly is first in the 
province of Guipuzcoa. 
The élections held thus far do not include farm laborers and small 
farmers. According to the weekly magazine Cambio 16 an estimated 
250,000 are members or supporters of the farm unions that are affiliated 
with the various labor confédérations. The UGT's Land Workers Fédé-
ration is considered the largest among them. In ail likelihood, however, 
the situation in the countryside remains fluid and uncertain and it is 
somewhat prématuré to make any accurate judgments regarding the 
degree of support the various competing unions can count upon. 
Workers in the large enterprises appear to hâve given substantial 
support to UGT while the Workers Commissions has obtained a greater 
degree of support from médium and small-sized establishments. 
Both UGT and CC.OO. hâve had to rely heavily on foreign assis-
tance to finance the large sums required to conduct a massive nation-
wide élection campaign. The principal source of UGT assistance has 
been the socialist-oriented trade unions of Western Europe, especially 
those of West Germany, The Netherlands and Scandinavia. Assistance 
was also received from the International Confédération of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) and associated international Trade Secrétariats, most 
particularly the International Métal workers Fédération (IMF). 
Because of the strained relations between the Russian and Spa-
nish Communist Parties little if any assistance was received from the 
USSR but the Soviet-controlled World Fédération of Trade Unions 
(WFTU) did provide modest financial contributions. Since the Italian 
and Spanish parties share the generally common political out-
look — Eurocommunism, a close relationship has developed on both 
party and trade union levels. The Italian General Confédération of La-
bor (CGIL) has consistently provided extensive assistance to the 
CC.OO. and the French General Confédération of labor (CGT) has also 
provided various types of support. It is probable that the Eastern Eu-
ropeans, especially the Yugoslavs and the Romanians are among the 
benefactors of the CC.OO. There hâve been reports in the Spanish 
press that the East Germans are the source of large financial donations. 
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What conclusions can be drawn from the élection results? It is 
clear that at least half of Spain's work force considers itself part of the 
organized labor movement. This part of the labor force is located in the 
most important and strategically situated sectors of the economy. It is 
prématuré to speculate concerning the numbers of those participating in 
the plant élections who will eventually enroll as dues paying members 
of trade unions. This will dépend largely upon the efficacy of the 
unions in serving their supporters and the nature of the collective bar-
gaining statute that awaits action by the Cortes. 
Spain's labor relations System seems to be evolving along distinc-
tive lines but somewhat comparable to the French and Italian models. 
The présence of both CC.OO. and UGT representational influence in 
most industries and large enterprises must lead to multi-union bargai-
ning patterns both at local and industry levels. In fact this has already 
become an established practice in the collective bargaining negotiations 
that hâve taken place since last year. It also appears likely that the 
Spanish UGT will émerge as the most représentative and best-
organized among the Socialist-oriented national labor centers in the la-
tin countries of Western Europe. 
The trend toward a structure of labor relations that involves a 
high degree of politicization has been strongly underscored. There are, 
of course, sound historical antécédents to support this phenomenon, 
but current social and political developments are serving to strengthen 
this process. Furthermore, the current économie recession and the 
consequently enlarged rôle of the government in the formulation of 
économie and wage policy can only stimulate further developments in 
this direction. A worker's wage in Spain today is influenced more by 
what transpires in the Cortes and the Government than what he can 
hope to obtain at the bargaining table. Most workers seem to hâve un-
derstood this and they hâve therefore demonstrated a préférence for 
trade union organizations that are linked with the major parties of the 
Left. On the other hand, the politieizing process tends to weaken and 
undercut the rôle and influence of the unions particularly at this early 
stage of development and may be detrimental to any effort to instill 
strong institutional allegiances. 
Whatever hopes harbored by politicans of the center right for the 
création of an allied trade union force seem to hâve been largely dissi-
pated. Prior to the élections some efforts were made in Catalonia and 
elsewhere to encourage and even support various unaffiliated or inde-
pendent labor groups. The results suggest that most of the organized 
labor sector is now closely identified with the political Left and little 
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prospect exists for the establishment of a labor group with substantial 
influence that would be politically congenial to the UCD. 
Présent indications suggest that the CC.OO. has emerged as the 
labor organization with the greatest amount of support. Nonetheless, 
possibly the most remarkable aspect of the élection is the fact that its 
margin of superiority has now been reduced to a point where it is no 
longer possible to speak of CC.OO. hegemony. The UGT has become a 
movement of comparable size and influence. Henceforth, hegemony is 
to be shared with the UGT. This shift in trade union power relations 
has far-reaching political conséquences. 
As récent as 1976 the dominance of the CC.OO. appeared so 
overwhelming that only the most foolhardy would hâve had the teme-
rity to predict the degree of relative parity that has now occured. Since 
the late fifties following the Communist Party shift to a tactic of infiltra-
tion and working inside the officiai (vertical) unions of the Franco ré-
gime, a steady growth in Communist influence took place. By the early 
sixties it was able increasingly to assume control of the Workers 
Commissions movement which operated as an opposition force within 
the officiai union structure. Despite police repression and fréquent em-
ployer persécution, by the late sixties and early seventies supporters of 
the Commissions came to dominate the employées représentation 
committees (Jurados de Empresas) in the coal mines and most impor-
tant industrial establishments. As a resuit, for example, an estimated 
80% of the présent Barcelona leadership of the CC.OO. is composed of 
men who formerly occupied officiai positions in the vertical unions. 
The ranks of the CC.OO. activists also served as an important recrui-
ting source for the PCE.4 
As the Franco era came to an end, the CC.OO. therefore had 
good reason to view the future with confidence. In 1974 a small corps 
of trained dedicated Communist activists in Portugal had succeeded in 
virtually taking over intact the entire government-controlled syndical 
structure. A similar strategy was not feasible in Spain, but the 
influence of the CC.OO. in the government-controlled unions placed it 
in a dominant position. As in Portugal, France and Italy, Spain seemed 
destined to possess a labor movement with strong Communist domi-
nance. 
Prospects for the UGT at that time were discouraging in the ex-
trême. During the repression of the fifties, the organization had lost 
4
 Slightly less than a third of the 85 members who compose the PCE's Madrid 
régional committee are officiais of the CC.OO. 
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some of its finest surviving cadres and for many years thereafter, aside 
from a few remaining enclaves, its présence inside Spain could hardly 
be observed. Moreover, Socialists maintained a policy of refusai to par-
ticipate in any organ of the Franco régime, an attitude that facilitated 
the Communist success in gaining control of the Workers Commissions 
since they found themselves virtually unopposed in filling a leadership 
vacuum during the sixties and early seventies at a time of massive 
worker opposition to the Franco régime. As a resuit, having enabled 
their supporters to hold office in the officiai unions, the PCE emerged 
from the Franco era with a sizeable number of expenenced trade union 
activists. 
UGT membership in late 1975 and early 1976 has been variously 
estimated at 10,000 to 25,000. But from that time on the organization 
underwent a phoenix-like résurgence, one that was aided by various 
tactical errors on the part of the PCE leadership. For example, the 
success of the Commissions had been due in large measure to its func-
tional efficacy and its ostensibly broad political non-partisan character. 
But this was compromised by the décision of the party in 1977, intent 
upon promoting the PCE image, to hâve 21 of 23 members of the 
Workers Commissions national secrétariat publicly disclose their party 
affiliations. Moreover, as the PCE tightened its control over the 
CC.OO., several extrême left political groups with some influence se-
ceded and founded competing labor organizations. 
The extraordinary growth of the UGT also underscores the impor-
tance that tradition and history sometimes play in the fate of social or 
political movements. The socialist trade union has been closely 
identified with the struggles and aspirations of Spanish workers since 
its inception in the 1880s. Largo Caballero, the leader of the UGT in 
the twenties and thirties, also served as Prime Minister during the civil 
war. The fathers of thousands of workers of the présent génération are 
former UGT members. Once the UGT reappeared as a viable trade 
union alternative many of their sons resumed their families' traditional 
Socialist allegiances. 
The Communist leadership of the Workers Commission was able 
to count on a more récent record of accomplishment, one that proved 
partially effective despite the image problem encountered by the 
Communist Party in the June parliamentary élections. As the Socialist 
résurgence gathered force, it became clear that the unchallenged pré-
dominance of the CC.OO. could no longer be maintened. But after 
more than 15 years as the leading oppositional force within the 
Franco-style labor System, the CC.OO. continued to exercise conside-
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rable influence. The prestige it enjoyed among many workers and a su-
periority in experienced cadres hâve permitted it, despite the over-
running of many of its former strongholds by its Socialist rivais, to no-
netheless émerge as the leading trade union center. This has also 
contributed to the disproportionately large influence exercised by 
Workers Commissions leaders in the internai affairs of the Communist 
Party. 
The stratégie outlook of the Socialists has been particularly affec-
ted by the élection results. We hâve previously noted that Spanish poli-
tical affairs are greatly influenced by the rivalry between the two prin-
cipal political forces ; the UCD of Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez and 
PSOE under the leadership of its talented General Secretary, Felipe 
Gonzalez. The Socialists are preparing their bid for power and expect 
to be successful in their quest possibly by 1979 or 1980. But the PSOE 
leadership has been deeply concerned that, once in power, they might 
share the fate of their Portuguese colleague, Mario Soares, namely to 
hâve achieved broad popular support but crippled in économie 
policy-making and political flexibility by the leverage accruing to a 
Communist Party that possesses labor hegemony. 
The loss of trade union hegemony is the second body blow rende-
red PCE hopes and aspirations within less than a year. As the Franco 
era neared its end, it appeared unquestionable that the PCE would 
émerge as the principal party of the Left in the Post-Franco period. 
Then came the startling results of the June, 1977 parliamentary élection 
in which the PSOE received 29% of the vote to only 9% for the 
Communists. 
The présent approximate parity suggested by available élection 
results merely represents the inauguration of a contest for trade union 
superiority that is not likely to be definitively resolved for a number of 
years. The ultimate outeome will be determined by many factors, 
above ail by the ability of the respective organizations to effectively 
represent their clientèles. 
If the UGT has benefitted from the greater acceptability of its So-
cialists identity it, nevertheless, faces challenging problems in absor-
bing and retaining the great mass of new recruits that hâve flooded in 
during the récent past. A shortage of experienced leaders is a pressing 
dilemma. 
It is precisely in this area that the Workers Commissions possess 
an important advantage. The many years of participation in organiza-
tion and collective bargaining during the Franco era has permitted the 
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formation of a small army of trained activists and it is probably due to 
their présence that worker défections to the UGT hâve not been grea-
ter. In fact, the CC.OO. électoral achievement is partly due to the fact 
that many workers voted CC.OO. because it was the only organization 
they knew directly. The CC.OO. can therefore be expected to provide 
formidable compétition in the struggle for labor hegemony. 
Whatever the ultimate outcome of the trade union rivalry, the first 
plant élections in four décades for the sélection of trade union repré-
sentatives of the workers' choosing marks the second major électoral 
process that has been accomplished in the re-establishment of démocra-
tie institutions. The results of that popular consultation augur well for 
the future development of a modem System of industrial relations and 
démocratie labor organization in Spain. 
Syndicats et politique en Espagne aujourd'hui 
Les élections syndicales qui ont eu lieu en Espagne pendant la première 
moitié de l'année 1978 ont mis définitivement fin aux quatre décennies d'autori-
tarisme du régime Franco dans les relations de travail et elles ouvrent l'avène-
ment d'un système de relations professionnelles plus en harmonie avec ceux 
qu'on retrouve dans les sociétés démocratiques de l'Europe de l'Ouest. Les 
élections en vue du choix des représentants des salariés ont marqué la deu-
xième consultation populaire (la première ayant consisté dans les élections 
parlementaires de juin 1977) à avoir lieu depuis la disparition de Franco. Les 
résultats auront des conséquences majeures sur l'apparition des formations po-
litiques nationales, sur la restructuration des relations professionnelles et sur 
les stratégies des principaux partis politiques. 
Les élections ont commencé à la mi-janvier et se sont poursuivies jusqu'à 
mai. Sur six millions de salariés inscrits, la moitié d'entre eux environ ont par-
ticipé au choix des délégués et des comités d'usine en vue de remplacer ceux 
qui existaient sous le régime du travail franquiste. Les différentes organisations 
syndicales en lice, récemment légalisées, rivalisèrent pour obtenir l'appui des 
travailleurs en recherchant l'élection de leurs militants respectifs. 
Le gouvernement, désireux d'empêcher l'Union générale des travailleurs 
(UGT) d'obédience socialiste d'obtenir la victoire et de contribuer à la remon-
tée du parti socialiste des travailleurs (PSOE), qui avait été rétabli, manipula 
les règles de base afin de tenir les élections de façon à favoriser la Confédéra-
tion syndicale des comités de travailleurs (CCOO) contrôlée par les communis-
tes. 
Un nombre déroutant d'organisations syndicales ont participé aux élec-
tions à partir des vestiges des organisations syndicales franquistes jusqu'aux 
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régionalistes, aux communistes, aux socialistes autonomes, aux maoïstes, aux 
indépendants et aux syndicats-maison. La Solidarité des travailleurs basques 
(STV) et LAB qui sont l'extension syndicale du mouvement séparatiste basque 
ont aussi recherché l'appui des salariés dans ce district. La Confédération na-
tionale du travail (CNT), groupement anarcho-syndicaliste ancien, qui est au-
jourd'hui une force marginale sur la scène du syndicalisme, a décidé de boycot-
ter les élections, mais, en quelques endroits dispersés, les travailleurs ont 
quand même voté pour des candidats s'en réclamant. 
Les résultats des élections démontrent que ces organisations ont peu 
d'attrait pour les travailleurs et que la confédération syndicale des comités de 
travailleurs (CCOO) et l'Union générale des travailleurs (UGT) ont émergé en 
tant que leurs principaux porte-parole, car soixante-dix pour cent des représen-
tants nouvellement élus dans 30,000 entreprises appuient l'un ou l'autre de ces 
mouvements. Parmi les groupes régionaux, la Solidarité des travailleurs bas-
ques (STV) a eu le plus de succès en se hissant au deuxième rang en pays bas-
que et en se classant première dans la province de Guipuzcoa. 
Bien qu'il y ait beaucoup de controverse concernant le calcul des résul-
tats d'ensemble des élections par le ministère du Travail, il est évident que la 
CCOO a réussi à faire élire le plus grand nombre de ses partisans. Ce qui est 
plus important, toutefois, c'est le fait que les comités de travailleurs ne peuvent 
plus se réclamer d'une hégémonie indiscutable et que le mouvement syndical 
espagnol comprend maintenant deux centrales syndicales principales qui 
s'équivalent tant en nombre qu'en influence. Le système espagnol de relations 
professionnelles semble évoluer vers une forme d'alignement de forces qui se 
compare aux modèles français et italien. La présence à la fois de la CCOO et 
de l'UGT dans la plupart des industries et des grandes entreprises doit néces-
sairement conduire à des négociations multilatérales tant au niveau local qu'in-
dustriel. En réalité, cela est déjà devenu un fait accompli lors des négociations 
collectives qui ont eu lieu depuis l'an passé. Il est aussi apparent que l'UGT 
émergera comme la plus représentative et la mieux organisée parmi les centra-
les d'allégeance socialiste dans les pays latins d'Europe de l'Ouest. 
La parité approximative qu'indique le résultat des élections est le point 
de départ d'une lutte pour la suprématie syndicale qui ne sera vraisemblable-
ment pas résolue avant de nombreuses années. L'issue finale dépendra de plu-
sieurs facteurs, en particulier, de l'habileté des organisations à représenter 
efficacement leur clientèle. 
Quelle que soit l'issue ultime de la rivalité syndicale, la première élection 
au niveau de l'entreprise en quatre décennies pour le choix des représentants 
des travailleurs marque la deuxième expérience électorale qui a eu lieu depuis 
le rétablissement des institutions démocratiques. Les résultats de cette consul-
tation populaire augurent bien pour le développement futur d'un système de re-
lations professionnelles et de l'organisation syndicale démocratique en Espa-
gne. 
